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THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
PROGRAM OF INTERCEPTING AND
FORCIBLY RETURNING HAITIAN
BOAT PEOPLE TO HAITI:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS
Arthur C. Helton*
L Introduction
This article discusses the policy consequences of the United
States government program, in operation in various forms since 1981,
to intercept at sea and forcibly return Haitian boat people to Haiti.
The evolution of the return program is described and analyzed in the
context of refugee policy, both internationally and in the United
States. Policy implications are analyzed and recommendations are
made for a reformulated policy response.
II. Establishment of the Return Program
A. The Interdiction Authority
In 1981, the administration of President Ronald Reagan
determined that illegal immigration had become "a serious national
problem detrimental to the interests of the United States."' Haitian
migration was of particular concern to the Reagan administration in
1980, when about 15,000 Haitians had come unlawfully to the United
States by boat.' Invoking both constitutional and statutory authority,
Director, Refugee Project, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights; A.B., Columbia
University, 1971; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1976.
'Proclamation No. 4865,46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1988).
2 Letter from Department of State to Rep. Clive Benedict (Jan. 5, 1982) (on file
with the New York Law School Journal of Hwnan Rights).
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President Reagan announced the creation of an interdiction program
designed to deter the illegal migration of Haitian boat people. The
Haitian Migrant Interdiction Program was established by
Proclamation 4865,1 which suspended the entry of the relevant class
of individuals, and Executive Order 12,324," which implemented the
proclamation, both issued on September 29, 1981. Under this
program, United States Coast Guard vessels were to stop and board
suspicious Haitian or unflagged vessels on the high seas, determine
if their passengers were undocumented Haitians bound for the United
States, and if so, return them to Haiti.'
According to the Proclamation, the migration of
undocumented aliens to the United States, and in particular, of illegal
aliens arriving by sea, had reached significant proportions by 1981.
This movement of migrants had "severely strained the law
enforcement resources of the Immigration and Naturalization Service"
and "threatened the welfare and safety of communities" in the
southeastern United States.6 Relying on the authority granted the
President "by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States,
including sections 212(f)7 and 215(a)(1)' of the Immigration and
' Proclamation No. 4865,46 Fed. Reg. 48,107(1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1988).
4 Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1988).
5Id.
I Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1988).
7 8 U.S.C. § 1182(o (1988), the codification of § 212(f), states:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or any class
of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests
of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period
as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any
class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the
entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
s 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (1988), the codification of § 215(a)(1), provides in relevant
part:
Unless otherwise ordered by the President, it shall be unlawful - (1)
for any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or
enter the United States except under such reasonable rules,
regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and
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Nationality Act, as amended," the Proclamation declared that the
entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas was suspended and
would be prevented by the interdiction of vessels carrying such
aliens.9
Executive Order 12,324 purports to grant to the Secretary of
State the power to enter into "cooperative arrangements with
appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal
migration to the United States by sea. 10 The Coast Guard is
empowered, pursuant to an arrangement with a specific government,
to "stop and board defined vessels, when there is reason to believe
that such vessels are engaged in the irregular transportation of
persons or violations of United States law or the law of a country
with which the United States has an arrangement authorizing such
action,"" to "establish the registry, condition and destination of the
vessel and the status of those on board the vessel,"12 and to "return
the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came."13
These interdictions are to occur only "outside the territorial waters of
the United States"' 4 on vessels of the United States, those without
nationality, and those of foreign nations with which the United States
has entered into an agreement."5 Finally, and most fundamentally,
the Executive Order provides that "no person who is a refugee will
be returned without his consent,"' 6 and that there will be "strict
observance of our international obligations concerning those who
genuinely flee persecution in their homeland. 17
exceptions as the President may prescribe.
9 Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1988).
0 Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1988).
" Id. § 2(c)(1).
12 Id. § 2(c)(2).
"3 Id. § 2(c)(3).
14 Id. § 2(d).
" Id. § 2(b)(1)-(3).
1e 8 U.S.C. § 1182, at § 2(c)(3).
7 Id. § 3.
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B. Agreement with Haiti
Referring to its obligations under international refugee law,
the United States entered into a cooperative agreement with Haiti on
September 23, 1981, through an exchange of diplomatic letters."8
The agreement states:
Having regard to the need for international
cooperation regarding law enforcement measures
taken with respect to vessels on the high seas and the
international obligations mandated in the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York
31 January 1967, the United States Government
confirms with the Government of the Republic of
Haiti its understanding of the following points of
agreement. 9
Specifically, the Haitian government agreed to assist the United States
government to "stop the clandestine migration of numerous residents
of Haiti to the United States."20 At the outset of the program, the
United States agreed to the presence on United States Coast Guard
vessels of a representative of the Haitian Navy to act as a liaison in
interdiction activities. 21 The United States also pledged not to return
to Haiti any refugee when it agreed "that under these arrangements
the United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any
Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to
qualify for refugee status. 22
Finally, the Haitian government gave assurances that it would
not prosecute intercepted Haitians for having illegally departed from
Haiti. The accord specifically states: "The United States Government
I" Agreement on Interdiction of Haitian Immigration to the U.S., Sept. 23, 1981,
U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, 3559.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE
FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAIIAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT
13 (1990).
22 Agreement on Interdiction of Haitian Immigration to the U.S., Sept. 23, 1981,
U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559, 3560.
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appreciates the assurances which it has received from the Government
of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians returned to their country and
who are not traffickers will not be subject to prosecution for illegal
departure. ,,23
C. Implementation of the Interdiction Program
The Haitian interdiction program was implemented in four
phases. The first phase lasted from the inception of the initiative in
1981 to early 1991, when certain administrative changes, including
enhancements in interviewing procedures, were made. The second
phase was comprised of the re-configured program and it lasted until
September 1991, when Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was
deposed. The third phase lasted from the overthrow of Aristide until
President Bush issued a May 24, 1992, Executive Order that
purported to authorize the return of intercepted Haitians without prior
inquiry into any claims of persecution. The fourth phase concerns
the program subsequent to the 1992 Executive Order to the present.
According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), since the inception of the interdiction program in 1981 until
September 1991, 433 boats were intercepted and 23,551 Haitians
were returned to Haiti.' According to the bilateral agreement, INS
interviewers and interpreters examined the intercepted Haitians on a
designated Coast Guard cutter. If a person was found to have a
reasonable fear of returning to Haiti, that person was to be taken to
23 id.
24 See Susan Freinkel, A Slow, Leaking Boat to Limbo, TmE RECORDER, Dec. 19,
1991, at 1. See also Lizette Alvarez, Refugee Policy Hits Crossroads, MIAbICHERALD,
Dec. 1, 1991, at IA (refugee advocates said it was inconceivable that of 22,000 Haitians
intercepted at sea through 1990, only eight were truly attempting to escape political
persecution); Howard W. French, U.S. is Holding 200 Haitians on 2 Ships, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1991, at A3 (between the signing of the treaty in 1981 and November 1991
more than 23,000 Haitians have been intercepted at sea by the Coast Guard; only 28
were allowed to enter the United States in order to pursue their claims of political
asylum). Compare 246 Fleeing Haiti Are Rescued, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1991, § 1,
at 1 (U.S. official stated that about 100 Haitians had been given the right to apply for
asylum in United States); Howard W. French, U.S. Starts to Return Haitians who Fled
Nation After Coup, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1991, at Al (U.S. official stated that "about
50" Haitians had been allowed into the U.S. to apply for asylum).
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the United States to apply for asylum in accordance with the
Immigration and Nationality Act. As the agreement states: "It is
understood that under these arrangements the United States
government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants
whom the United States authorities determine to qualify for refugee
status. "25
Yet of the over 23,000 Haitians who were intercepted over
the decade since the beginning of the program, only 28 individuals
were taken to the United States to apply for asylum.26 Indeed, by
March 1990, nine years after the interdiction program was established
and one year before enhanced interviewing procedures were
implemented, "only six had been taken to the U.S. to apply for
asylum." '27 This was during a period when Haiti had several
governments with records of serious human rights abuses, including
the government of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier.28
Over an eight month period after President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide was ousted in September 1991,29 over 38,000 Haitian boat
people were intercepted by United States Coast Guard vessels."
Initially, they were encamped on those vessels, and later in a United
States military base in Cuba.3" Out of that total, INS interviewers
identified 10,747 Haitian boat people as having plausible asylum
Agreement on Interdiction of Haitian Immigration to the U.S., Sept. 23, 1981,
U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559.
2 Howard W. French, U.S. Is Holding 200 Haitians on 2 Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 1991, at A3.
27 LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE
FORCED RETURN OF HATIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAmIAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT
3 (1990).
" See In the Army's Hands: Human Rights in Haiti on the Eve of the Elections,
HUMAN RTs. REP. (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1990, at 1; The More
Things Change ... Human Rights in Haiti, HUMAN RTS. REP. (Americas Watch, New
York, N.Y.), Feb. 1989, at 1.
" For a general discussion of the coup of Aristide, see Howard W. French, Troops,
Storming Palace, Capture Plotters and Free President, N.Y. TIMMS, Jan. 8, 1991, at Al.
o Islands of Inequality, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A18.
3' See Deborah Sharp, Haitian Refugees see Hope with a New Administration, USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 1992, at 3A. The vast majority of the Haitians were held at the U.S.
naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id.
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claims warranting further consideration by the United States.' 2
Others were interviewed at sea by INS officials under difficult
conditions that included overcrowding, sickness, and fatigue.33
In the early stages of the influx, the United States State
Department sought a regional arrangement in order to share the
burden.34 Foreign policy-makers were concerned that the return of
those screened out would be inconsistent with the sanctions imposed
by the Organization of American States and supported by the United
States. 5 United States diplomats thus searched for other Caribbean
and South American countries to accept the intercepted Haitians.36
However, the authorities of those countries were skeptical that the
emergency justified the dispeisal of the boat people in the region.37
Some United States officials argued for the return of those
who did not appear to need refugee protection in order to deter more
Haitians from arriving.38 Ultimately, this argument prevailed and
about 30,000 boat people have been forcibly returned to uncertain
fates in Haiti.39 This includes over 5000 who have been summarily
repatriated without inquiry into their claims of persecution.' The
repatriation came as a result of an Executive Order issued by
President George Bush on May 24, 1992.4
The so-called "Kennebunkport Order" of May 24, 1992,
purports to authorize the Coast Guard forcibly to repatriate Haitians
interdicted at sea, without even a cursory inquiry to ascertain whether
32 See Al Kamen, Large Wave of Boat People Sails from Haiti, WASH. POST, Apr.
16, 1992, at A6.
'3 Arthur C. Helton, Haitian Refugees in PoliticalLimbo, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24,
1991, at Li, L6.
3' Arthur C. Helton, U.S. Refugee Policy: African and Caribbean Effects, 9
TRANSAFRICA FORUM 93, 99 (Summer 1992).
3 Arthur C. Helton, Haitian Refugees in Political Limbo, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24,
1991, at Li, L6.
SId.
37Id.
Id. at Ll.
s See Islands of Inequality, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A18; Arthur C. Helton,
Haitian Refugees in Political Limbo, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 24, 1991, at L1.
40 Islands oflnequality, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A18.
41 Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 .(1992).
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they have valid asylum claims.42 Specifically, the order states that
refugee treaty obligations "do not extend to persons located outside
the territory of the United States."4' The order provides: "However,
that the Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide
that a person who is a refugee will not be returned without his
consent. "'I It specifies that the order is not to be "construed to
require any procedures to determine whether a person is a refugee. ",a
III. The Global Refugee Context
Currently, more people are in flight around the world from
persecution, war, human rights violations, and other events seriously
disturbing public order than at any time since World War Two.'
42 id.
' Id. The Kennebunkport Order permitting summary return reiterates a position
taken in 1989 by the State Department, when it stated, "the Refugee Convention
obligation [against non-refoulement] only pertains to persons who have already entered
the territory of the state. In the U.S. view, it does not apply to persons who arrive at
the frontier of the state or who are travelling with the intention of entering the state."
Arthur C. Helton, Open Letter to Ambassador Jewel S. Lafontant, United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 2 IrNr'L
J. REFUOEE L. 130, 132 (1990) (quoting an official in the State Department's Refugee
Bureau).
Exec. Order No. 12,807 § 2(c)(3), 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
4 Exec. Order No. 12,807 § 3, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,134 (1992).
See generally House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee Hearing, Reuters,
Mar. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (cultural and religious
intolerance is leading to new violations of human rights in Africa, the Middle East, and
South Asia); Tatyana Krasnova, Dissidents Flee to Moscow, Russian Press Digest, Mar.
4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (Uzbekistan human rights
advocates are forced to flee to Moscow); Susan Mazur, In the Sands of Sudan People
Flee for Their Lives, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 1993, at 32 (United Nations condemns Sudan
Government for human rights violations); Alan Ferguson, War Crimes Clues Sifted in
Croatia, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 20, 1993, at Al (citing to gross violations of international
law in Croatia); Henry Kamm, In Europe's Upheaval, Doors Close to Foreigners, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1993, at Al (in the past ten years Western Europe has seen a tenfold
rise in the number of migrants seeking asylum); Stephen Kinzer, Rights Groups Attack
German Plan on Refugees, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1993, § 1, at 11 (citing Amnesty
International report indicating that gross human rights violations are officially tolerated
in India, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and other nations); Javier Rodriguez, Latinos are
Selling out on Free Trade, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at B5 (violations of human rights
1993] HAITIAN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports "no less
than 18 million" refugees around the world.47 Even more people are
displaced within their home countries; they have not yet crossed a
border, in which case they would become of concern to the
international community as refugees under international law with a
fear of persecution upon return.48
Apart from the magnitude of the situation, the end of the Cold
War has changed the context for refugee protection. Governments,
particularly those of Western developed countries, increasingly treat
those once considered to be part of refugee movements as
unauthorized migrants. Foreign policy ceases to be a motivating
force to assist and protect refugees. Instead, budgetary constraints
come to the fore.49 Migration management becomes a guiding
principle, and most asylum seekers are considered economic migrants
from less developed countries.50
IV. United States Refugee and Asylum Policy
Refugees can gain status in the United States in one of two
ways. They can either be determined a "refugee"51 and be admitted
in Mexico include increased use of torture, persecutions, and political assassinations).
' Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statement to the
Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov. 10, 1992) (on
file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights).
48See LAWYERS COMMrrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNCERTAIN HAVEN: REFUGEE
PROTECTION ON THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS REFUGEE
CONVENTION 3 (1991) ("There are up to 35 million additional persons displaced within
their home countries, who have not yet crossed a border to become refugees with a fear
of persecution upon return under international law.").
" See Reena Shah, Foreign Aid May Help U.S. More, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec.
30, 1990, at IA (many U.S. citizens are critical of aiding foreign nations due to budget
constraints).
" LAWYERS COMMrEE FOR HUMAN IGHTS, UNCERTAN HAVEN: REFUGEE
PROTECTION ON THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1951 UNrrED NATIONS REFUGEE
CONVENTION 5 (1991).
SI The term "refugee" is defined as:
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and
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from abroad,52 or they can apply for and be granted "asylum" once
in the United States.53 Both procedures can lead to permanent
resident status.54
The Refugee Act of 198055 gave United States officials the
power to establish annual ceilings for overseas admissions. Political
considerations are integral to the design of the admissions system.
The President, in consultation with Congress, establishes the ceilings
for refugee admissions each year, and may consider "foreign policy"
in determining which refugees are of "humanitarian concern" to the
United States.5 6 These factors permit the application of political and
geographical standards in the overseas procedure. As a consequence,
the vast majority of refugees admitted from abroad over the past
decade have been those fleeing communism in Eastern Europe, the
Soviet Union, and Indochina. 7
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion, or (B) in such circumstances as the President
after appropriate consultation. . . may specify, any person who is
within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a
person having no nationality, within the country in which such
person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The term 'refugee' does not include any person who
ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
52 Id. § 1157 (1988).
I ld. § 1158 (1988).
s Id. § 1159 (1988).
s Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
8 U.S.C. § 1157(e) (1988).
s See Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An
Unfui/illed Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 243 (1984) (also discussing experience in
the asylum area).
Seventy-eight percent of the Russian, sixty-four percent of the
Ethiopian, fifty-three percent of the Afghan, and forty-four percent
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Once an asylum seeker arrives at the United States border, he
or she is exempt from admissions ceilings. In such a case, an asylum.
applicant can seek protection irrespective of immigration status.5"
The protection claim can be made affirmatively to the INS or raised
as a defense to removal in immigration court proceedings. 59 Final
asylum rules issued in 1990 created a professional corps of
adjudicators who are to be assisted by a documentation center on
conditions in an applicant's country of origin.,' The professionalism
of the corps was designed to keep it separate from immigration
enforcement functions.61 Its access to country conditions information
was designed to reduce reliance on State Department foreign policy
preferences. 62 Adequate resources will be required, of course, for
effective implementation in order to achieve the objective of
insulation from foreign policy and immigration enforcement
considerations contemplated in the issuance of the 1990 rules.63
V. Policy Implications of the Haitian Return Program
The policy of summarily returning Haitian boat people
established under the May 24, 1992 Executive Order' departs from
accepted international practice. Countries much less capable of
absorbing asylum seekers are much more generous than the United
States. In many cases, those countries are refraining from returning
of the Romanian cases decided received political asylum, all
involving persons fleeing Communist-dominated regimes. On the
other hand, asylum was granted in less than eleven percent of the
Philippine, twelve percent of the Pakistani, two percent of the
Haitian, two percent of the Guatemalan and three percent of the
Salvadoran cases.
Id. at 253.
- 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
5 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1992).
55 Fed. Reg. 30,680 (1990).
SI Arthur C. Helton, Final Asylum Rules: Finally, 67 IrNTERREr RmjsEs 789,
790 (1990).
Id. at 792.
' Id. at 793.
Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
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asylum seekers to places where the violence is not as threatening as
that in Haiti. For example, neither Pakistan nor Iran is making an
effort to deport the six million Afghan refugees that have lived on
their territories for the last decade, some of whom are now
voluntarily returning.65 In Africa, 300,000 Ethiopians, Somalis, and
Sudanese have recently found asylum in Kenya." Beleaguered
Bangladesh is sheltering about 270,000 Rohingyas who fear return to
the oppression in Burma; they are encamped in makeshift housing in
an already overcrowded and impoverished region of Bangladesh.67
The conduct of the United States in returning Haitian boat
people without inquiry into their claims of feared persecution
constitutes a drastic departure from the international practice in favor
of protection. Indeed, the United States return policy is a remarkable
exercise in hypocrisy. When it was politically expedient, the United
States government argued against forced repatriation. Most notably,
the United States used strong language to promote in Southeast Asia
the very principles it has derogated in Haiti.' 8 In 1989, the Deputy
Secretary of State urged nations receiving Vietnamese boat people to
do the following:
We must, first of all, unequivocally reaffirm the
practice of first asylum . . . [C]ountries of first
asylum would commit to:
* Treating all asylum seekers in a humane manner,
" Granting the UNHCR immediate access to all new
arrivals, and
* Working in close collaboration with the UNHCR
See Afghanistan: The Will But Not the Means, REFUoEES, Sept. 1992, at 20.
'See Sudanese Planes Fly Over Boarder Town; Security Forces Said to be Ready,
Brit. Broadcasting Corp., June 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File
(according to UNHCR Information Officer Panos Moumtzis, the Sudanese influx brings
the total number of asylum seekers in Kenya to close to 300,000).
See Repatriation or Refoulement, REFUGEES, Sept. 1992, at 38.
Haitian Refugees Sent Back Without Interview, Nat'l Public Radio, May 27, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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on screening mechanisms for determining refugee
status.69
In fact, it is generally recognized that the right of non-
refoulement is a principle of customary international law, binding
even on those states which are not parties to the international
conventions. 7  Article 33 of the 1951 United Nations Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, 71 as incorporated into its 1967
Protocol,' specifically imposes on all nations an obligation not to
expel or return ("refouler") refugees73 "[t]o the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion., 74 The United States Supreme Court has called the
'Arthur C. Helton, Open Letter to Ambassador Jewel S. Lafontant, United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D. C., 2 INT'L
J. REFUoEE L. 130, 132 (1990).
70 See, e.g., GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUoEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99
(1983) ("[Otherwise i]f each state remains absolutely free to determine the status of
asylum-seekers and either to abide by or ignore the principle of non-refoulement, then
the refugee's status in international law is denied and the standing, authority, and the
effectiveness of the principles and institutions of protection are seriously undermined.").
71 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260.
7 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
r Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, as amended by article 1(2) of the 1967
Protocol, defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(a)(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223,
6225.
4 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6276.
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obligation of non-refoulement "mandatory."75 It is binding on the
United States not only because the United States acceded to the 1967
Protocol, but also because it is customary international law that it is
binding irrespective of accession.76
It is also well established that the right of non-refoulement
applies equally to refugees seeking to enter a country as it does to
those who have already entered it. The text of Article 33 of the
Convention and Protocol specifies that refugees cannot be returned
"in any manner whatsoever," including by sea after interdiction. 77
Notwithstanding the plain language of the Protocol, however, the
United States government argues otherwise. The State Department
has relied heavily on brief comments made by the Dutch, French, and
Swiss representatives during the drafting of the 1951 Convention.78
Specifically, the Swiss delegate expressed the view that "return"
applied only to refugees already within the territory and that "Article
33 does not cover mass migrations or attempted mass migrations
'I Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429
(1987) (accession to the 1967 Protocol "imposed a mandatory duty.., not to return an
alien to a country where his 'life or freedom would be threatened."').
76 On a subsidiary point, Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol should be considered self-
executing and not requiring any implementing legislation to be enforced in U.S. courts.
Many courts addressing this question have found it.to be self-executing. See, e.g.,
Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 559 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Attorney General's authority to withhold deportation of aliens must be measured "in
light of the United Nations Protocol"); Kashani v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977) (Protocol is binding on the U.S.); Fernandez-Roque v.
Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (claims under Article 33 state valid cause of
action for which relief may be granted); Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270
(S.D. Fla. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 566 F.2d 104(5th Cir. 1978)
(Protocol establishes the right to a hearing for aliens threatened with exclusion). But see
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1245 (1992) (Article 33 of the Protocol is "not self-executing and thus provides no
enforceable rights"); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982) (Article 31 of the
Protocol creates no rights for detained Haitians beyond those in domestic law). In any
event, the United States is bound by dictates of customary international law, including
that of non-refoulement. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
S" Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6276.
' Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to
Timothy E. Flanigan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
(Dec. 11, 1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Hwnan Rights).
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across frontiers.1 79
The State Department's reliance on this language to interpret
the meaning of the word "return" (or "refouler") in the Protocol is
misplaced for several reasons. First, it is undisputed that, according
to the Vienna Convention, ° the plain language of the treaty governs
its interpretation, unless its meaning is ambiguous or would produce
unreasonable results. The language here is unambiguous. The
Convention and Protocol plainly bar the return of a refugee "in any
manner whatsoever.""1 Therefore, return of a refugee by land, by
air, or by sea, including high seas interdiction, is forbidden according
to the Protocol.
Moreover, the Dutch delegate's comments are inapposite.
The concerns he expressed were of a mass migration across the land
borders of Europe. 2 Having just witnessed the mass dislocations
caused by World War Two, the delegate surely sought to ensure that
his small country would not have to admit huge numbers of fleeing
Europeans. An exodus by sea was clearly not within his or the other
delegates' contemplation.
Interestingly, the United States delegate to the conference took
an entirely different view during the drafting phase. He explained:
It did not, however, follow that the convention would
not apply to persons fleeing from persecution who
asked to enter the territory of the contracting parties.
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a
refugee who asked admittance, or of turning him back
after he had crossed the frontier, or even of expelling
him after he had been admitted to residence in the
territory, the problem was more or less the same. 3
79 id. at 4.
" Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF
39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
8' Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 6276.
1 Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to
Timothy E. Flanigan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 5
(Dec. 11, 1991) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights).
' Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Summary Record of
the Twentieth Meeting, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.20 at 11-12 (1950).
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This elegantly simple statement of principle is persuasive.
All other interpretations of the provisions of Article 33 are
consistent with the view that it applies extraterritorially." The
Reagan Administration, the inspiration for the interdiction program,
considered itself bound by Article 33 when it began interdicting
Haitians in 1981. In an opinion issued by the Office of the Legal
Counsel, the Assistant Attorney General explicitly considered the
obligations imposed on the United States government by the
Protocol. 5 According to that opinion, Article 33 applies to refugees
interdicted on the high seas and mandates that "individuals who claim
that they will be persecuted for one of these [enumerated] reasons
must be given an opportunity to substantiate their claims. "'
In fact, the Reagan Administration did implement a screening
procedure. 7 While the procedure was criticized as inadequate, 8 it
reflected at least an acknowledgement of the existence of this
obligation. When the governmental Executive Committee of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has been called upon to interpret Article 33, it has found
that the protection against non-refoulement extends to refugees
seeking to enter a country. For example, the Executive Committee
has found Article 33 to have "reaffirm[ed] the fundamental
importance of the observance of the principle of non-refoulement --
both at the border and within the territory of a State -- of persons
who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their country of
origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally
" Proposed legislation introduced in 1992 in the U.S. House of Representatives
would have explicitly reaffirmed that "the obligations of the United States under Article
33 . . . have applied to the actions of the United States with respect to individuals
outside the United States." H.R. 5360, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992).
' Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels, 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242, 248
(1981).
Ild.
s Laurence H. Tribe & Jonathan S. Massey, Haiti's Refugees, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
9, 1992, at IC.
88 See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOuLEMENT:
THE FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAITIAN INTERDICTION
AGREEMENT (1990).
1993] HAITIAN POLICY IMPLICATIONS
recognized as refugees."89
Similarly, in detailing the procedures to be used when
determining refugee status, UNHCR has explicitly concluded that:
"The competent official (e.g. immigration officer or border police
officer) to whom the applicant addresses himself at the border or in
the territory of a Contracting State . . .should be required to act in
accordance with the principle of non-refoulement .... .,90
The UNHCR has gone so far as to appeal to governments to
"grant first asylum to refugees and displaced persons rescued at
sea. "I The UNHCR has clearly recognized that the right of non-
refoulement protects refugees before they enter the country of asylum
-- a rejection of the United States government's assertion that the
right of non-refoulement does not extend to persons located outside
the United States. That push-backs and other forms of rejection,
implemented before asylum seekers reach the border, constitute
refoulement is a broadly accepted principle. 92
The logic here is straightforward. The right of non-
refoulement becomes a hollow promise if nations can circumvent it
by stopping the refugees before arrival. Surely, this would be a
perverse outcome.
" U. N. Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on International Protection
of Refugees and on the Sub-Committee of the Whole, 28th Sess., Conclusion No. 6(c),
at 14 (1977). The United States is a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee.
'o U.N. Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on International Protection
of Refugees and on the Sub-Committee of the Whole, 28th Sess., Conclusion No. 8(e),
at 16 (1977).
91 U.N. Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on International Protection
of Refugees and on the Sub-Committee of the Whole, 27th Sess., Conclusion No. 2(h)(i),
at 10 (1976).
' In addition to Article 33 of the Protocol, other international instruments and
expressions of state practice affirm the principle of non-refoulement for those seeking
entry after crossing an international border. Article II of the 1969 Organization of
African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
prohibits "rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to
return to, or remain in, a territory where his life, physical integrity, or liberty would be
threatened." 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 48. Other agreements and accords specifically
recognizing the protection against rejection and forcible return include Comm. of the
Ministers, Eur. Consult. Ass. Rec. No. R(84)1, Jan. 25, 1984 and Res(67)14, June 29,
1967 and the Asian-African Legal Consult. Comm., Principles Concerning Treatment
of Refugees art. VII(3), (1966) reprinted in UNHCR, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUMENTS CONCERNING REFUOzGS 201 (1979).
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VI. Race as a Factor in United States
Immigration and Refugee Policy
The early years of the United States were characterized by an
open immigration policy. This period was also noteworthy for the
homogeneity of those arriving: the majority of settlers were of
English origin.93 In the 1830s, a nativist movement emerged and
became influential, directing its animosity principally against Catholic
immigrants." The "Know-nothing" party was founded on the idea
that accepting immigrants of diverse backgrounds could lead to the
destruction of national identity and the erosion of American culture.95
Only when people of different races arrived of their own volition in
the United States did race appear as an explicit factor in the
formulation of United States immigration policy.
The first racially identifiable group to arrive voluntarily in the
United States was the Chinese.96 Their arrival was spurred by the
discovery of gold in California in 1848 and the subsequent need to
link its burgeoning economy with the East Coast by rail 97 The first
law of Congress to restrict immigration based on ethnicity or race
was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which effectively stopped the
flow of Chinese immigrants.9"
Japanese immigration became a factor after the turn of the
century. In the first decade of the 1900s, 129,000 Japanese
immigrants arrived. 99 President Theodore Roosevelt negotiated in
1907 the so-called "Gentlemen's Agreement" under which the
Japanese government agreed to screen the number of Japanese-issued
passports for the United States.1°°  The numbers dropped
Arthur C. Helton, U.S. Refugee Policy: African and Caribbean Effects, 9
TRANSAFRICA FORUM 93, 95 (Summer 1992).
" See JOHN HIOHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM 1860-1925 3-11 (1955).
Id. at 4.
Arthur C. Helton, U.S. Refugee Policy: African and Caribbean Effects, 9
TRANSAFRICA FORUM 93, 95 (Summer 1992).
97 id.
' Id. at 95-96.
9 Id. at 96.
too id.
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dramatically. 1
The restrictionist movement peaked in the 1920s. The Ku
Klux Klan was active." ° In 1921, the Johnson Act, also called the
Emergency Immigration Restriction Act, was passed. It was the first
bill to base all immigration on a strict quota system on national
origin. 0 3 The Immigration Act of 1924, or the Johnson-Reed Act,
lowered. national origins quotas. °4
In 1952, Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act"05 over
President Harry Truman's veto."° It purported to remove racially
based restrictions on immigration. In reality, it allowed only a trickle
of immigration from Asia by creating the "Asian-Pacific Triangle."
Only one hundred emigres from each country in the triangle area
were permitted, making for a total quota of 2000 from the area. 7
In addition, the Act continued using a quota system based on national
origins, thereby reinforcing the discriminatory effects of the earlier
laws.108 The Senate Committee's report concerning the bill explicitly
favored northwestern Europeans by stating that United States
immigration policy should continue to prefer those more readily
assimilable due to their affinity with the majority of the population of
the country. °9 .
The national origins quota system, despite much opposition,
remained intact until 1965. The 1965 amendments to the
Immigration and Naturalization Act established a ceiling of 20,000
immigrant visas to persons in any one country in the Eastern
hemisphere and 120,000 for the Western hemisphere."' The Act also
ranked preference categories based on family relations and
occupation; sons and daughters of United States citizens had first
10 Id.
102 JOHN HIaHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIvISM
1860-1925 286-99 (1955).
".3 Id. at 308-11.
'o Id. at 316-24.
'0 Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
' Arthur C. Helton, U.S. Refugee Policy: African and Caribbean Effects, 9
TRANSAFRICA FORUM 93, 97 (Summer 1992).
107 Id.
108 Id.
'0 Id. at 97-98.
10 Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
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priority."' In the decade after the passage of the 1965 amendment,
immigration increased, including arrivals from Asia." 2
Provisions in the Immigration Act of 1990,1 designed to
diversify the migrant stream, instead reflect a continued preference
for European immigrants. The provisions initially make 40,000
immigrant visas available to nationals of countries adversely affected
by the 1965 amendments, mainly Europeans.11 4 Race thus continues
to resonate as a factor in the development of United States
immigration policy.
In terms of refugee admissions, only about two percent of the
one million-plus refugees brought to the United States since 1980
have come from Africa, the continent with the largest number of
refugees. 1 Specifically, in 1991, 112,811 refugees were admitted
to the United States from places of first asylum abroad -- but only
4424 were from Africa, and eighty-nine percent were from
communist Ethiopia.11 6  This figure reflects an ideological
predilection and legacy which has all too frequently dominated United
States refugee policy in the past.11 7
"U Id.
112 Arthur C. Helton, U.S. Refugee Policy: African and Caribbean Effects, 9
TRANSAFRICA FORUM 93, 98 (Summer 1992).
8 U.S.C. § 1255a note (Supp. III 1991).
"1 Arthur C. Helton, U.S. Refugee Policy: African and Caribbean Effects, 9
TRANSAFRiCA FORUM 93, 98 (Summer 1992).
115 Id.
116 Id.
17 See Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An
Unfuyflled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1984). The United States, as well as
other countries with programs of overseas refugee admission, has long promoted a
"regional" solution which has the effect of keeping African refugees in Africa. At the
same time, the United States has taken hundreds of thousands of refugees from other
regions of the world. The only region of the world less represented this decade in
overseas admissions is Latin America, from which scores of thousands of individuals
have come and sought political asylum within the territorial confines of the United
States. Id. at 253-54.
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VII. A New Policy Response
President Bill Clinton has vowed to reverse the Bush
Administration policy concerning the Haitian boat people."n More
recently, the Clinton Administration has expressed concern about not
provoking a large-scale departure of boat people in establishing a new
policy." 9 Since President Clinton's inauguration, three boats have
been intercepted and 280 Haitians have been summarily returned to
Haiti under the Kennebunkport Order. 120
Clearly, an overly hesitant or minimalist approach risks a
violation of a campaign promise and loss of credibility; an activist
approach without a contingency plan could invite an influx and create
an unwanted immigration emergency. A delicate balancing act will
be required.
A balanced policy could involve the following elements:
S Work to end violations of fundamental human
rights in Haiti. It will be crucial to recognize that
widespread human rights abuses committed against the
civilian population by the military authorities is a
basic cause of the flight of Haitian refugees. The
work of the United Nations Secretary-General's
recently appointed Special Envoy to Haiti, Dante
Caputo, could be usefully enhanced by deploying a
substantial corps of human rights monitors, who
would remain until the situation in Haiti has
improved. The presence of such international
monitors would document and could prevent rights
violations. A concerted political effort to address the
problem at the source would give Haitians cause to
I. On May 27, 1992, then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton stated: "I am appalled
by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas
and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering their claim to political asylum. This
process must not stand." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; The Two Clintons, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at A17. On November 12, 1992, shortly after Mr. Clinton was
elected president, he stated: "We should have a process in which these Haitians have
a chance to make their case. Id.
"' J.F.O. McAllister Washington, Lives on Hold, TImm, Feb. 1, 1993, at 50.
12 Coast Guard Intercepts 280 Haitians, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 1993, at 2B.
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hope and avert the perceived need to flee.
0 Establish regional protection arrangements for
boat people under the auspices of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees. A United States-led
senior diplomatic effort could identify a few countries
in the region to provide temporary refuge to Haitians
until dangers in Haiti subside. Financial resources
would have to be committed, and the United States
naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba could be used
for this purpose until suitable diplomatic arrangements
can be made. Screening by specially trained
adjudicators should occur under reliable circumstances
to determine which Haitians qualify for admission as
refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution.
Voluntary return to Haiti of non-refugees could be
promoted. Improved procedures could be established
in Haiti to admit true refugees and avoid the need to
flee by boat.12
2 In-country refugee processing should not, however, be regarded as an exclusive
method of protection of Haitians. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, in a
confidential plan prepared in January 1993, specifically observed that interviewing
refugee applicants outside Port-au-Prince would be "problematic" and "would require the
use of buildings or offices normally used for other purposes. Such facilities might not
provide INS officers with space in which they could ensure the confidentiality of their
interviews. Additionally, even minimal security standards could not be met."
IMMIoRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., CARIBBEAN MASS MIoRATION PLAN App.
A (Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Hwnan Rights).
INS observed in particular:
While some individuals believe that provincial processing will reduce
the risk of interview for refugee applicants, the opposite may be
found to be true. The large numbers of people in Port-au-Prince
also provide refugee applicants with anonymity. Individuals coming
forward for interview in provincial locations will be.more visible
and, therefore, perhaps more vulnerable to retribution.' The
expansion of the in-country program to sites outside Port-au-Prince
is dependent on the good will of the de facto government. Should
the regime now in power object to an expansion, the U.S. refugee
program will not locate outside Port-au-Prince. The United States
will not negotiate such an expansion, as it does not formally deal
with the de facto government of Haiti.
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Last year, a relatively low-level diplomatic effort was
undertaken by the Bush Administration to find Caribbean and South
American countries willing to permit Haitians to remain
temporarily." This initiative occurred early in the emergency and
at a time when the United States had agreed to accept but a tiny
number of boat people. Subsequently, the United States accepted
some 11,000 Haitians who established a credible fear of persecution
upon return.12 Now, the United States can demonstrate that it is
willing to accept a fair share of the burden, and countries in the
region can be assured that they would not be hosts to long-staying
populations of asylum seekers.
A public information campaign in Haiti to deter non-refugees
from departing could be instituted, followed by a pilot program of
rescuing Haitian boat people at sea. This is a workable approach that
deserves serious and urgent consideration. A few hundred Haitians
who were transported temporarily to Honduras and Venezuela last
year returned to Haiti shortly thereafter."' Similar arrangements
have helped to control the movement of Vietnamese boat people in
Asia and provide protection to genuine refugees.1 25
0 Provide temporary status to Haitians currently in
the United States and at Guantanamo. A grant by the
Attorney General of Temporary Protected Status to
Haitians in the United States under our immigration
law could provide them with protection from return
and authorization to work in yearly increments. Such
a measure would permit individuals to remain in
dignity in the United States, including the almost
11,000 who were recently brought from Guantanamo
to the United States whose cases burden an already
Id.
'22 See Arthur C. Helton, Clinton's Challenges: Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10,
1993, at Ml.
123 Id.
124 Id.
1' See Arthur C. Helton, The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese
Refugees: An Experiment in Refugee Protection and Control, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 111, 112-14 (1990).
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poorly resourced asylum procedure.126  The
approximately 250 Haitians who have tested positive
for HIV and their dependents, who are currently
confined on Guantanamo, should be brought to the
United States on humanitarian grounds in view of the
limited treatment and care facilities available at the
naval base. 127
In a misguided attempt to balance United States policy, some
have called on the authorities to repeal the Cuban Refugee
Adjustment Act of 1966,128 resulting in "equal mistreatment" of
Cubans. A better approach would be to ensure the fair treatment of
Haitians, including a special legislative remedy for the boat people
who, prior to the executive order, were determined to warrant full
asylum procedures and were brought to the United States. Many of
these Haitians will win asylum. A special residence provision for
Haitians, like that for Cubans, would conserve the scarce
administrative resources of an already overburdened asylum system.
Generosity, not equal deprivation, is the best solution for the policy
disparity.
VIII. Conclusion
The United States government program to intercept and
forcibly return Haitian boat people to Haiti is violative of the
international law norm of non-refoulement and destructive to
international solidarity. The erosion in refugee protection under
United States policy also raises disturbing implications regarding race
as a factor in the formulation of policy.
The Haitian summary return program presents an agenda for
126 See Cheryl Little, Viewpoints, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 3, 1992, at 25A; Some
Refugees Miss Health Checks, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 1992, at 6B; Struggle Goes on
Afier Guantanamo, MIAMI HERALD, June 22, 1992, at 1A.
27 See Arthur C. Helton, Clinton's Challenges: Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10,
1993, at M1.
"2 Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161
(1966).
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reform in the Clinton Administration. The task will be to reconcile
migration control interests in such a way as to preserve protection for
genuine refugees. How the balance is finally struck will have a
lasting effect on the future of refugee protection in the United States
and abroad.

